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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
the plaintiff did not entitle the defendant to summary judgment in a
negligence action.
The Jawitz court may have overlooked the significant broadening
of the applicability of summary judgments since the Israel deci-
sion. Under the RCP, summary judgment was unavailable in negli-
gence actions.129 CPLR 3212 now authorizes its use "in any action"
except matrimonial actions.13 0 Thus, the Israel court was powerless,
and the Jawitz court was free to grant a motion for summary judg-
ment. 18
ARicLE 34--CAENDAR PRACTICE;
TRLt , PR FERENCES
CPLR 3403: Tort action lacking proper venue denied general prefer-
ence.
CPLR 3403 requires that nonpreferred civil cases be tried in the
sequence in which their notes of issue are filed. Since the statute thus
serves to postpone such actions indefinitely,13 2 all parties seek a special
preference under it, or where one is not obtainable, a general'prefer-
ence through compliance with the applicable appellate division rules
regulating preferences.tm
In Chiques v. Sanso,3 4 the plaintiffs, residents of Nassau and Dut-
chess Counties, sought a general preference in a negligence action
commenced in Westchester County against defendants who were resi-
dents of Nassau County and New Jersey. 85 In denying the plaintiffs'
motion without prejudice to renewal in a proper forum, the Supreme
Court, Westchester County, held that they had failed to comply with
subdivision (a) of section 674.1 of the Rules and Regulations of the
120 RCP 113. The section was amended a year after Israel to essentially its present
form. See Firm ANNU L RlmaxoRT op =a N.Y. JUDICIAL CoNraam c 20 (1960); 4 WK&AM
3212.01, 3212.03.
180 For a discussion of the special provisions for summary judgment in matrimonial
actions contained in CPLR 3212(d), see 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 3212, commentary at 446
(1970).
131 See Dent v. Baxter, 37 App. Div. 2d 908, 325 N.Y.S.2d 672 (4th Dep't 1971) (mem.);
Clements v. Peters, 33 App. Div. 2d 1096, 308 N.Y.S.2d 258 (4th Dep't 1970) (mem.);
Jansen's Bottled Gas Serv., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 47 Misc. 2d 461, 262 N.Y.S.2d
768 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1965).
132 4 WK&M 3403.04.
133 Chiques v. Sanso, 72 Misc. 2d 376, 377, 339 N.Y.S.2d 394, 397 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1972), citing Haas v. Scholl, 68 Misc. 2d 197, 199, 325 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846-47 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1971). Also, certain cuses are preferred as of course, e.g,, commercial
and matrimonial actions. See 4 WK&M 3403.03.
14 72 Misc. 2d 376, 339 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1972).
135 The court noted that the corporate defendant had a "nonexistent address" in the
state, but was in fact incorporated in New Jersey. Id., 339 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
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Appellate Division, Second Department, 3 which states in part that a
general preference may be obtained provided "[t]hat the venue of the
action was properly laid in the county in which it is pending, within
the requirements of the CPLR... ."87 In so holding, the court found
that the plaintiffs' choice of venue, Westchester County, was improper
under CPLR 503(a) unless the action was jurisdictionally required to
be tried there, 38 since Westchester was not the county where one of
the parties resided at the time of the commencement of the action. The
court further noted that this finding was not impeded by the defen-
dants' failure to oppose the motion or the failure by any of the parties
to request a change in venue.3 9
This decision implements the court's inherent power to control its
calendar, 140 the cited appellate division rule, and the inconvenient
forum policy.141 "[W]here, as here, one or more of the parties reside in
a county in the State the venue preference requirement is singularly
applicable and the preference must be sought in the county in which
one of the parties resides."'142
AiTiCLE 41 - TgiAL BY A JURY
CPLR 4102: Validity of jury waiver clause in lease upheld in action
sounding in contract.
Prior to the 1965 enactment of section 259-c of the Real Property
Law, courts frequently upheld lease provisions in which the right to a
jury trial was waived by the contracting parties. 148 Section 259-c limits
the efficacy of such clauses by invalidating a jury trial waiver "in any
action for personal injury or property damage."'" Recently, however,
in Lindenwood Realty Co. v. Feldman,145 the Appellate Division,
186 22 NYCRR 674.1(a) (actions for damages for permanent disability or death).
187 72 Misc. 2d at 380, 339 N.YS.2d at 400.
188 Id. at 379, 39 N.Y.S2d at 899.
39 Id., 339 N.Y.S.2d at 398-99, citing Carbide & Carbon Chems. Co. v. Northwest
Exterm. Co., 207 Misc. 548, 139 N.YS.2d 480 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1955).
14o See 4 WK&M 3403.02.
141 See Asaro v. Audio by Zimet, Inc., 69 Misc. 2d 316, 330 N.Y.S.2d 25 (Dist. Ct.
Suffolk County 1972) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JoHN's L REV. 148,
161 (1972); Suriano v. Hosie, 59 Misc. 2d 973, 302 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County
1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JoHN's L, REV. 532, 588 (1970).
142 72 Misc. 2d at 380, 339 N.YS.2d at 399.
143 Lease waiver provisions have been strictly construed, however, and limited to
actions seeking to enforce rights originating under the lease. See 14 CARMODY-WAT 2d,§ 90:262, at 211 (1967); 4 WK&M 4102.14. See geneally 3 J. RAsCH, LANDLoan AND TENArT
§ 1344 (2d ed. 1971).
144 N.Y. REAL Pnop. LAw § 259-c (McKinney 1968).
'45 40 App. Div. 2d 855, 38 N.YS.2d 245 (2d Dep't 1972), rev'g mem. 72 Misc. 2d 68,
388 N.Y.S.2d 243 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1971).
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